Abstract. We present a simple technique by which a device that performs private key operations (signatures or decryptions) in networked applications and whose local private key is activated with a password or PIN can be immunized to offline dictionary attacks in case the device is captured. Our techniques do not assume tamper resistance of the device but rather exploit the networked nature of the device in that the device's private key operations are performed using a simple interaction with a remote server. This server, however, is untrusted -its compromise does not reduce the security of the device's private key unless the device is also captured -and need not have a prior relationship with the device. We further extend this approach with support for key disabling, by which the rightful owner of a stolen device can disable the device's private key even if the attacker already knows the user's password.
Introduction
A device that performs signatures or decryptions using the private key of a public key pair and that stores the private key locally on stable storage is typically vulnerable to exposure of that private key if the device is captured. While encryption of the private key under a password is common, the ease with which passwords succumb to offline dictionary attacks (e.g., see [18, 28, 36, 42] ) implies that better protections are needed. Many such protections have been proposed, but most require tamper resistance of the device. Others used in practice replace the password with a stronger key stored on another device * Extended abstract appears in Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE symposium on security and privacy, May 2001.
that the user holds, thus moving the burden of protection to that device.
In this paper, we propose a simple, software-only technique to render the private key of a networked device invulnerable to offline dictionary attacks, even if the device is captured. Our technique exploits the fact that the device has network connectivity at the time it is required to perform a private key operation and thus can interact with a remote party at that time to complete the operation. This is characteristic of virtually any device involved in an interactive authentication or key exchange protocol.
The way we exploit network connectivity is to postulate a remote server that assists the device in performing its private key operation. This remote server need not have any preexisting relationship with, or knowledge of, the device (though the device needs a public key for the server). Moreover, the server is untrusted: we prove that the server, even if it misbehaves, gains no information that would help it to compute signatures that verify with the device's public key or to decrypt messages encrypted under the device's public key. The only behavior that we require of the server is that it execute the correct protocol to respond to a well-formed request and that it stop responding to invocations pertaining to a device's public key (perhaps for a period of time) after it has received a sufficient number of malformed requests associated with this public key. This latter behavior is required to prevent an online dictionary attack against the password. We note, however, that this feature does not present a denialof-service vulnerability since in our protocol an attacker can conduct an online dictionary attack only after it has captured the device -and so use of the device by the legitimate user is presumably already denied.
We present two types of protocols that achieve the above properties. These types functionally differ in whether they enable the device's private key to be disabled . If the device is stolen, it is natural for the device's rightful owner to wish to disable the use of the private key to account for the possibility that the attacker already knows the user's password (e.g., by observing the user type it) or can guess it in very few tries (e.g., due to his intimate knowledge of the user). In one type of protocol we present, the user can issue a request to the server to disable future use of the private key associated with the device's public key. Once the server receives this request and verifies it is well formed, the device's key is rendered (provably) useless to the attacker, even if the attacker knows the user's password. The attacker will thus be unable to employ the key in future interactive protocols or to decrypt future encrypted messages. This feature is especially useful if revocation of the device's public key via a public key infrastructure (e.g., a certificate revocation list) has an associated delay (if it exists at all); in contrast, under our system the private key can be disabled immediately.
The ability to disable a private key seems to come at a cost in terms of compatibility with existing protocols. Our protocol without this feature is compatible with any public key cryptosystem or signature scheme in use by the device and any protocol using them. In contrast, our protocols supporting key disabling are dependent on the type of private key operations in use; here we give protocols for RSA [39] signatures and ElGamal [17] decryption. These easily generalize to many other signature and decryption protocols. In addition, to achieve provable security, our signature protocols supporting key disabling expose the message being signed to the server. As such, it is compatible only with applications that sign public data. This is consistent with, e.g., TLS 1.0 [15] but is incompatible with protocols that sign private data before encrypting them. There are variations of our RSA signature protocol, for example, that do not require the message to be disclosed to the server, but proving them secure requires nonstandard assumptions about the security of RSA.
Prior work
To our knowledge, the work that bears most conceptual similarity to our own is that of Yaksha [20] , a public key extension to Kerberos. Yaksha shares our goals of achieving password-protected private key operations that are not vulnerable to offline dictionary attacks, and the user's device employs a remote server to achieve this protection. However, there are a number of important differences between our work and that of Yaksha. First, Yaksha supports only RSA private key operations. In contrast, here we present protocols for any type of private key operations (generically), for RSA signatures, and for ElGamal decryption; also, other private key operations can be accommodated within our framework, including DSA signatures, as a corollary of [33] . Second, Yaksha does not provide security against server compromise, i.e., the Yaksha server must be trusted, whereas ours need not be.
Third, the Yaksha server requires initialization per user, whereas our server does not. These latter two properties make the server component of our solution more suitable to a service-provider offering, for example.
More distantly related work is [25] . This work proposes methods to encrypt a DSA or RSA private key using a password so that guesses at the password cannot be verified by an attacker who captures the device holding that private key. This feature comes at a severe price, however. For example, the device's "public" key must be kept secret, even from the device itself: obviously if the attacker learns the public key, then he can verify a successfully decrypted private key. So the public key must be hidden from all but a few trusted servers that verify signatures produced by the device or encrypt messages for the device. And it is essential that no verifiable plaintext be encrypted since this too could be used to verify guesses at the password. In contrast, our work achieves similar goals without imposing such awkward system constraints. Our solutions require nothing of the system surrounding the device other than the ability of the device to communicate over a network when it performs private key operations.
One way to partially reach our goals is to simply not store the device's private key on the device but rather have the device download it from the server when needed (e.g., [37] ). Indeed, one of our protocols somewhat resembles this approach. To ensure that the private key is downloaded only to the user's device, the device first proves it has been given the user's password. For this purpose there are numerous published protocols by which the device can authenticate to and exchange a key with a server using a password input by its user, without exposing that password to offline dictionary attacks. Some protocols require the device to already have a public key for the server (e.g., [19, 24, 31] ), while others do not (e.g., [5, 9, 11, 27, 32, 41] ). Since the device stores at most only public information, its capture is of no consequence. On the other hand, in all of these protocols, the server either knows the user's password or else can mount an offline dictionary attack against it. More importantly, when these protocols are used for the retrieval of a private key from the server, the private key (which would most likely be encrypted with the password) would be exposed to the server after a successful offline dictionary attack on the password. Recent proposals resort to multiple servers and require that at most some threshold cooperate in a dictionary attack [19] , but nevertheless this remains a differentiator of our approach: our server is entirely untrusted. A second differentiator of our work is that prior work does not permit key disabling to address the possibility that an attacker already knows the user's password or guesses it quickly: once the attacker guesses the password and downloads the private key, the attacker can use it for an unlimited time. In contrast, we present protocols in which the private key can be disabled, even after the attacker has captured the user's device and guessed the user's password.
Short of rendering the device's private key invulnerable to an offline dictionary attack once the device is captured, perhaps the next best thing is to ensure that the private key cannot be used to sign messages dated before the device was captured. This is achieved by forward secure signature schemes, which intuitively change the private key (but not the public key) over time so that the captured private key can be used to sign messages only dated in the future (e.g., [4, 30] ). If the device can sense that its private key is about to be discovered, as might be possible if the device is a coprocessor with tamper detection circuitry, then another alternative is for the device to change the private key when it detects a pending compromise so that future signatures subliminally disclose to an authority receiving those signatures that the device has been compromised [23] . In contrast to these approaches, our goal is to prevent any future signatures by the attacker once the device is captured rather than permit them in a limited way (as forward secure signature schemes do) or in a way that subliminally alerts an authority (as in [23] ).
Finally, our use of a server to assist the device in performing signatures or decryptions is reminiscent of server-aided protocols, whereby the computational burden of a secret cryptographic computation is moved from the device to a more powerful server. Some of these protocols place trust in the server and thus expose the device's private information to it (e.g., [1, 16] ), while others attempt to hide the private key from the server but nevertheless have the server do the bulk of the computation (e.g., [2, 26, 34] ). Our work differs in its goals: our intention is to render the device impervious to an offline dictionary attack once captured, rather than to reduce the computation required of the device. On the contrary, in our protocols, the device ends up performing at least as much computation as it would if it were to perform the secret computation entirely itself. While it seems fairly straightforward to combine our protocols with some of these techniques, doing so while maintaining provable security looks to be a challenge.
Preliminaries
In this section, we informally state the goals for our systems. We also introduce preliminary definitions and notation that will be necessary for the balance of the paper.
Goals
We presume a system with a device dvc and a server svr that communicate by exchanging messages over a public network. In our protocols, the device is used either for generating signatures or decrypting messages and does so by interacting with the server. The signature or decryption operation is protected by a password π 0 . The system is initialized with public data, secret data for the device, secret data for the user of the device (i.e., π 0 ), and secret data for the server. The public and secret data associated with the server should simply be a certified public key and associated private key, which most likely would be set up well before the device is initialized. The deviceserver protocol allows a device operated by a legitimate user (i.e., one who knows π 0 ) to sign or decrypt a message with respect to the public key of the device, after communicating with the server. In those systems supporting key disabling, device initialization may create additional secret data that, if sent to the server, would cause the server to no longer execute the decryption or signing protocol with that device.
Each adversary we consider is presumed to control the network, i.e., the attacker controls any inputs to dvc or svr and observes their outputs. Moreover, an adversary can "capture" certain resources. The possible resources that may be captured by the attacker are dvc, svr, and π 0 . Once captured, the entire static contents of the resource become known to the attacker. The one restriction on the adversary is that if he captures dvc, then he does so after dvc initialization and while dvc is in an inactive statei.e., dvc is not presently executing the protocol with π 0 as input -and π 0 is not subsequently input to the device by the user. This decouples the capture of dvc and π 0 and is consistent with our motivation that dvc is captured while not in use by the user and, once captured, is unavailable to the user.
We denote by Adv(S), where S ⊆ {dvc, svr, π 0 }, the class of adversaries who succeed in capturing the elements of S. As such, Adv(S 1 ) ⊆ Adv(S 2 ) if S 1 ⊆ S 2 . The security goals of our systems are informally stated as follows:
I. Any adversary in Adv({svr, π 0 }) is unable to forge signatures or decrypt messages for the device (with overwhelming probability). II. Any adversary in Adv({dvc}) can forge signatures or decrypt messages for the device with probability at most q/|D| after q invocations of the server, where D is the space from which the user's password is drawn (uniformly at random). III. Any adversary in Adv({dvc, svr}) can forge signatures or decrypt messages for the device only if it succeeds in an offline dictionary attack on the user's password. IV. Any adversary in Adv({dvc, π 0 }) can forge signatures or decrypt messages for the device only until the device key is disabled (in those systems supporting key disabling) and subsequently cannot forge signatures or decrypt messages for the device.
In our proofs, we assume that the user never mistypes π 0 into the device. In real life, however, mistypes may occur. Allowing for mistypes would not affect our security results with respect to adversaries in Adv({svr, π 0 }) and Adv({dvc, π 0 }), but it could affect our security results with respect to other adversaries. Adversaries in Adv({dvc}) could obtain information about the frequency of mistypes from observing failed signature/decryption attempts, and thus if the frequency of mistypes varied with different passwords, this would provide information about π 0 to the adversary. Adversaries in Adv({dvc, svr}) could obtain even more information about mistypes than simply the frequency, e.g., whether two mistypes are equal. Then in some cases, even if the frequency of mistypes were equal for all passwords, this would provide information about π 0 to the adversary.
Definitions
In order to state our protocols to meet the goals outlined in Sect. 3.1, we first introduce some definitions and notation.
Security parameters. Let κ be the main cryptographic security parameter; a reasonable value today may be κ = 160. We will use λ > κ as a secondary security parameter for public keys. For instance, in an RSA public key scheme we may set λ = 1024 to indicate that we use 1024-bit moduli.
Hash functions. We use h, with an additional subscript as needed, to denote a hash function. Unless otherwise stated, the range of a hash function is {0, 1} κ . We do not specify here the exact security properties (e.g., one-wayness, collision resistance, or pseudorandomness) we will need for the hash functions (or keyed hash functions, below) that we use. To formally prove that our protocols meet every goal outlined above, we generally require that these hash functions behave like random oracles [6] . (For heuristics on instantiating random oracles, see [6] .) However, for certain subsets of goals, weaker properties may suffice; details will be given in the individual cases.
Keyed hash functions. A keyed hash function family is a family of hash functions {f v } parameterized by a secret value v. We will typically write f v (m) as f (v, m), as this will be convenient in our proofs. In this paper, we employ various keyed hash functions with different ranges, which we will specify when not clear from context.
We will also use a specific type of keyed hash function, a message authentication code (MAC). We denote a MAC family as {mac a }. In this paper, we do not require MACs to behave like random oracles but to have the following standard property: if a is unknown, then given zero or more pairs m i , mac a (m i ) , it is computationally infeasible to compute any pair m, mac a (m) for any new m = m i .
Encryption schemes. An encryption scheme E is a triple (G enc , E, D) of algorithms, the first two being probabilistic, and all running in expected polynomial time. G enc takes as input 1 λ and outputs a public key pair (pk, sk), i.e., (pk, sk) ← G enc (1 λ ). E takes a public key pk and a message m as input and outputs an encryption c for m; we denote this c ← E pk (m). D takes a ciphertext c and a private key sk as input and returns either a message m such that c is a valid encryption of m, if such an m exists, and otherwise returns ⊥. Our protocols require an encryption scheme secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks [38] . Practical examples can be found in [7, 13] .
Signature schemes. A digital signature scheme S is a triple (G sig , S, V ) of algorithms, the first two being probabilistic, and all running in expected polynomial time. G sig takes as input 1 λ and outputs a public key pair (pk, sk), i.e., (pk, sk) ← G sig (1 λ ). S takes a message m and a private key sk as input and outputs a signature σ for m, i.e., σ ← S sk (m). V takes a message m, a public key pk, and a candidate signature σ for m as input and returns 1 if σ is a valid signature for m and otherwise returns 0. That is, V pk (m, σ ) ∈ {0, 1}. Naturally, if σ ← S sk (m), then V pk (m, σ) = 1.
We say a signature scheme is matchable if for each public key pk produced by G sig (1 λ ) there is a single private key sk that would be produced (i.e., the probability of (pk, sk) ← G sig (1 λ ) and (pk, sk ) ← G sig (1 λ ) with sk = sk is zero), and there is a probabilistic algorithm M that runs in expected polynomial time and takes as input a public key pk and a private key sk and returns 1 if sk is the single private key corresponding to pk (i.e., if G sig (1 λ ) could have produced (pk, sk) with nonzero probability) and returns 0 otherwise. In most popular signature schemes, including those we consider here, there is a straightforward way to implement the M function. (We can define matchable encryption schemes similarly.)
A simple protocol without key disabling
We begin by presenting a simple protocol for achieving goals I, II, and III described in Sect. 3.1. Since this protocol remains the same regardless of whether the device is used to decrypt or sign, here we discuss the protocol using terminology as if the device is used for signing. This system is parameterized by the device's signature scheme S and an encryption scheme E for the server 1 and works independently of the form of S and E. We thus refer to this protocol as "generic", and denote the protocol by Generic.
The intuition behind Generic is exceedingly simple. At device initialization time, the private key of the device is encrypted in a way that can be recovered only with the cooperation of both the device (if it is given the user's password) and the server. This ciphertext, called a ticket , also embeds other information that enables the server to authenticate requests that accompany the ticket as coming from a device that has been given the user's password. When the device is required to perform an operation with its private key, it sends the ticket to the server. The device accompanies the ticket with evidence of its knowledge of the user's password; the server can check this evidence against information in the ticket. The server then performs a transformation on the ticket to "partially decrypt" it and returns the result to the device. The device completes the decryption to recover its private key. The device may then use the private key for performing the required operations and may even cache the key in volatile memory for some period of time so that additional operations can be performed without contacting the server for each one.
Note that a protocol of this form cannot support key disabling: if an attacker captures the device and guesses the user's password (i.e., the adversary is in Adv({dvc, π 0 })), then it can retrieve the private key and keep it forever. Limiting the damage an attacker can do in this case requires assistance from some external mechanism for revoking the device's public key, if such a mechanism exists.
In the following two sections, we detail the steps of the initialization algorithm and the key retrieval protocol. In Sect. 6, this system is formally proven (in the random oracle model) to meet goals I-III of Sect. 3.1.
Device initialization
The inputs to device initialization are the server's public encryption key pk svr , the user's password π 0 , the device's public signature verification key pk dvc , and the corresponding private signing key sk dvc . The steps of the initialization algorithm proceed as follows, where "z ← R S" is used to denote assignment to z of an element of S selected uniformly at random.
The values v, a, τ , pk dvc , and pk svr are saved in stable storage on the device. All other values, including sk dvc , π 0 , b, and c, are deleted from the device. We assume that f outputs a value of length equal to the length of sk dvc . For the protocol of Sect. 4.2, we assume this length is λ.
The value τ is the "ticket" to which we referred previously. Note that this ticket encapsulates a value c from which the device can recover sk dvc with knowledge of the user's password. The server's role in the key retrieval protocol will thus involve decrypting this ticket and sending c to the device (encrypted). Note that c does not provide the basis for the server to mount an attack against sk dvc since the server does not know v.
Key retrieval protocol
The input provided to the device to initiate the key retrieval protocol is the input password π and all of the values saved on stable storage in the initialization protocol of Sect. 4.1. The protocol by which the device retrieves sk dvc is shown in Fig. 1 .
In Fig. 1 , β is an authenticator that proves knowledge of π to the server. ρ acts as a one-time pad by which the server encrypts c to return it to the device. γ is an encryption of β and ρ to securely transport them to the server. The value δ is a message authentication code that is generated from the MAC key a stored on the device and that the server uses to confirm that this request actually originated from the device. Though δ is not required to prove security of this protocol, it nevertheless is important in practice: it enables the server to distinguish requests bearing τ but not originating from the device (i.e., mac a ( γ, τ ) = δ) from requests bearing τ that originate from the device but for which the device's knowledge of the user's password cannot be verified (i.e., β = b). The latter category may indicate an online dictionary attack, and accordingly the ticket τ should be ignored (perhaps for some period of time) after sufficiently many such requests. The former type should not "count against" τ , however, since they do not pose a risk to the password; indeed, the authenticator β is never checked in these cases. On the contrary, if this former category were treated like the latter, then this would enable a denial-of-service attack on τ (i.e., the device) in which an attacker, having seen τ pass on the network, submits requests to the server containing τ and random values for γ and δ.
It is important for security that the device delete β, ρ, and, of course, sk when it is done with them, so that none of these values is available to an attacker who subsequently captures the device. In particular, these values should never be stored on stable storage on the device to ensure, e.g., that they will disappear from the device if the device crashes.
dvc svr
Fig. 1. Generic key retrieval protocol
Brief intuition for the security of this protocol is as follows. First, goal I is achieved due to the encryption of sk dvc by f (v, π 0 ) since an adversary in Adv({svr, π 0 }) does not know v. Goal II is achieved since the only way an adversary in Adv({dvc}) gains information about the password is by submitting guesses at β (or rather, βs resulting from guesses at the password) to the server. Finally, even an adversary in Adv({dvc, svr}) is required to conduct an offline dictionary attack against the password to discover sk dvc since sk dvc is encrypted using f (v, π 0 ).
Systems supporting key disabling
In this section, we present protocols that satisfy all of the goals of Sect. 3.1, including the ability for the user to disable the private key of the device even after the attacker has captured the device and guessed the user's password. As described in Sect. 4, the reason that key disabling is not possible with Generic is that the device's private key is recovered by the device as part of that protocol. As a result, an attacker who captures the device and guesses the user's password can recover the private key and use it indefinitely.
To make key disabling possible, we thus design protocols in which the private key is never recovered by the device. Rather, the device performs each signature or decryption operation individually by interacting with the server. This is achieved by 2-out-of-2 function sharing, where the function being shared is the device's signature or decryption function. More precisely, when the device is initialized, two shares of the device's private key are generated. The first share is constructed so that it can be generated from the user's password and information stored on the device. The second share, plus other data for authenticating requests from the device, are encrypted under pk svr to form the device's ticket. Both shares are then deleted from the device. In the device's signature or decryption protocol, the device sends its ticket plus evidence that it was given the user's password, the server verifies this using information in the ticket, and then the server contributes its portion of the computation using its share. Together with the device's contribution using its share (generated from the user's password), the signature or decryption can be formed.
Disabling the private key sk dvc can be achieved by requesting that the server permanently ignore the device's ticket. Once this is done, further queries by the attacker -specifically, any adversary in Adv({dvc, π 0 }) -will not yield further signatures or decryptions. Of course, to prevent a denial-of-service attack against the device even without it being stolen, requests to disable the device's ticket must be authenticated; our protocols achieve this, too. Our protocols provably meet all of the goals stated in Sect. 3.1 in the random oracle model.
The feature of key disabling apparently comes with costs in terms of compatibility with existing protocols.
For example, in the signature protocol we demonstrate here, the server learns the message m being signed. It is therefore important that m be public information if the server is untrusted. This requirement is consistent with signatures in TLS 1.0 [15] , for example, since in that protocol parties sign only public information. However, it may be inconsistent with other protocols that encrypt private information after signing it. Second, due to our use of function sharing in these protocols, they are generally dependent on the particular signature or decryption algorithm in use. In the following subsections, we describe protocols for RSA signatures and ElGamal decryption, though our techniques also generalize to many other signature and decryption schemes.
S-RSA: a protocol for RSA signatures
In this section, we suppose the device signs using a standard encode-then-sign RSA signature algorithm (e.g., "hash-and-sign" [14] ) as described below. Accordingly, we refer to this protocol as S-RSA. The public key pair of the device is (pk dvc , sk dvc ) ← G RSA (1 λ ), where
, N is the product of two λ/2-bit prime numbers, and φ is the Euler totient function. (The notation ≡ φ(N ) means equivalence modulo φ(N ).) The device's signature on a message m is defined as follows, where encode is the encoding function associated with S and κ sig denotes the number of random bits used in the encoding function (e.g., κ sig = 0 for a deterministic encoding function):
Here the signature is σ = s, r , though it may not be necessary to include r if it can be determined from m and s. We remark that "hash-and-sign" is an example of this type of signature in which the encoding function is simply a (deterministic) hash of m, and that PSS [8] is another example of this type of signature with a probabilistic encoding. Both of these types of signatures were proven secure against adaptive chosen message attacks in the random oracle model [6, 8] . Naturally any signature of this form can be verified by checking that s e ≡ N encode(m, r). In the function sharing primitive used in our protocol, d is broken into shares d 1 and d 2 such that
In the following three sections, we detail the steps of the initialization algorithm, the signing protocol, and the key disabling protocol. In Sect. 7, this system is formally proven (in the random oracle model) to meet goals I-IV of Sect. 3.1.
Device initialization
The inputs to device initialization are the server's public encryption key pk svr , the user's password π 0 , the de-vice's public key pk dvc = e, N , and the corresponding private key sk dvc = d, N, φ(N ) . The initialization algorithm proceeds as follows:
Here we assume that f outputs an element of {0, 1}
λ+κ . The values t, v, a, τ , pk dvc , and pk svr are saved on stable storage in the device. All other values, including u,
, and π 0 , are deleted from the device. The values t and τ should be backed up offline for use in disabling if the need arises. The value τ is the device's "ticket" that it uses to access the server.
Signature protocol
Here we present the protocol by which the device signs a message m. The input provided to the device for this protocol is the input password π, the message m, and all of the values saved on stable storage in the initialization protocol of Sect. 5.1.1. The protocol is described in Fig. 2 .
In Fig. 2 , β is a value that proves the device's knowledge of π to the server. ρ is a one-time pad by which the server encrypts ν to return it to the device. r is a κ sig -bit value used in the encode function. γ is an encryption of m, r, β, and ρ to securely transport them to the server. δ is a message authentication code computed using a to show the server that this request originated from the device. As in Sect. 4, δ is not necessary to prove security relative dvc svr
return s, r to the goals of Sect. 3.1 but nevertheless is important in practice to prevent denial-of-service attacks. It is important that the device delete β, d 1 , and ρ when the protocol completes and to never store them on stable storage. The intuition behind the security of this protocol is similar to that for the Generic protocol. The major difference, however, is that only the server's contribution ν to the signature of m is returned to the device, not sk dvc (or the server's share of it). This is what makes key disabling possible, as described in Sect. 5.1.3.
The efficiency of the S-RSA protocol will generally be worse than the signing efficiency of the underlying RSA signature scheme, not only because of the message and encryption costs, but also because certain optimizations (e.g., Chinese remaindering) that are typically applied for RSA signatures cannot be applied in S-RSA. Nevertheless, since dvc can compute (encode(m, r)) d 1 mod N while awaiting a response from svr, a significant portion of the device's computation can be parallelized with the server's.
Key disabling
Suppose that the device has been stolen and that the user wishes to permanently disable the private key of the device. Provided that the user backed up t and τ before the device was stolen, the user can send t, τ to the server. Upon recovering a, b, u, d 2 , N ← D sksvr (τ ), the server verifies that u = h dsbl (t) and, if so, records τ on a disabled list. Subsequently, the server should refuse to respond to any request containing the ticket τ . This requires that the server store τ (or a hash of it) on a "blacklist". Rather than storing τ forever, though, the server can discard τ once there is no danger that pk dvc will be used subsequently (e.g., once the public key has been revoked). Note that for security against denial-of-service attacks (an adversary attempting to disable τ without t), we do not need h dsbl to be a random oracle, but simply a one-way hash function.
D-ElG: a protocol for ElGamal decryption
In this section, we give a protocol by which the device can perform decryption with an ElGamal [17] private key, using our techniques to gain the same benefits as S-RSA yielded for RSA signatures. We focus here on decryption (vs. signatures) and ElGamal (vs. RSA) to demonstrate the breadth of cryptographic operations to which our techniques apply. With respect to decryption, our techniques only apply to decryption schemes that do not have a private validity check, that is, a validity check that uses the private key. (For example, OAEP [7] is a scheme that uses a private validity check.) We also note that while protocols for signature schemes based on discrete logarithms (e.g., DSA [29] ) do not immediately follow from the protocol of this section, they can be achieved using more specialized cryptographic techniques, as corollaries of [33] .
For ElGamal encryption, the public key pair of the device is (pk dvc , sk dvc ) ← G ElG (1 λ ), where pk dvc = g, p, q, y , sk dvc = g, p, q, x , p is an λ-bit prime, g is an element of order q in Z * p , x is an element of Z q chosen uniformly at random, and y = g x mod p. For generality (and reasons that will become clearer later), we describe the D-ElG protocol using an abstract specification of "ElGamallike" encryption. An ElGamal-like encryption scheme is an encryption scheme in which (i) the public and private keys are as above and (ii) the decryption function D can be expressed in the following form:
Above, valid(c) tests the well-formedness of the ciphertext c; it returns 1 if well formed and 0 otherwise. select(c) returns the argument w that is raised to the x-th power modulo p. reveal(z, c) generates the plaintext m using the result z of that computation. For example, in original ElGamal encryption, where q = p − 1 and c = c 1 , c 2 = g k mod p, my k mod p for some secret value k ∈ Z q , valid( c 1 , c 2 ) returns 1 if c 1 , c 2 ∈ Z * p and 0 otherwise; select( c 1 , c 2 ) returns c 1 ; and reveal(z, c 1 , c 2 ) returns c 2 z −1 mod p. We note, however, that the private key is not an argument to valid, select, or reveal; rather, the private key is used only in computing z. Using this framework, the D-ElG protocol is described in the following subsections. We will discuss various ElGamal-like encryption functions and their use in this protocol in Sect. 5.2.4.
In the following three sections, we detail the steps of the initialization algorithm, the decryption protocol, and the key-disabling protocol. In Sect. 5.2.4, we describe various instantiations of these protocols using ElGamal-like encryption schemes. In Sect. 8, this system, instantiated with an ElGamal-like encryption scheme (i.e., an encryption scheme as described above, with a specific definition of security as described in Sect. 8), is formally proven (in the random oracle model) to meet goals I-IV of Sect. 3.1.
Device initialization
The inputs to device initialization are the server's public encryption key pk svr , the user's password π 0 , the device's public key pk dvc = g, p, q, y , and the corresponding private key sk dvc = g, p, q, x . The initialization algorithm proceeds as follows:
Here we assume that f outputs an element of {0, 1} 2|q| . The values v, a, τ , pk dvc , pk svr , and t are saved on stable storage in the device. All other values, including u, b, x, x 1 , x 2 , and π 0 , are deleted from the device. The values t and τ should be backed up offline for use in disabling if the need arises. The value τ is the device's "ticket" that it uses to access the service. Figure 3 describes the protocol by which the device decrypts a ciphertext c generated using the device's public key in an ElGamal-like encryption scheme. The input provided to the device for this protocol is the input password π, the ciphertext c, and all of the values saved on stable storage in the initialization protocol of Sect. 5.2.1. In Fig. 3 , h zkp is assumed to return an element of Z q .
Decryption protocol
The reader should observe in Fig. 3 that the device's decryption function is implemented jointly by dvc and svr. Moreover, ν, e, s constitutes a noninteractive zeroknowledge proof from svr (the "prover") to dvc (the "verifier") that svr constructed its contribution ν correctly. As before, β is a value that proves the device's knowledge of π to the server, γ is an encryption of c, β, and ρ to securely transport them to the server, and δ is a message authentication code computed using a to show the server that this request originated from the device.
Decryption via the D-ElG protocol is somewhat more costly than decryption in the underlying ElGamal-like encryption scheme. As in S-RSA, we recommend that dvc compute µ while awaiting a response from svr in order to parallelize computation between the two.
Key disabling
Like S-RSA, the D-ElG protocol also supports key disabling. Assuming that the user backed up t and τ before the device was stolen, the user can send t, τ to the server. Upon recovering a, b, u, g, p, q, x 2 ← D sksvr (τ ), the server verifies that u = h dsbl (t) and, if so, records τ on a disabled list. Subsequently, the server should refuse to respond to any request containing the ticket τ . We remind the reader that this requires the server to store τ (or a hash of it) on a "blacklist". Rather than storing τ forever, though, the server can discard τ once there is no danger that pk dvc will be used subsequently (e.g., once the public key has been revoked).
Choices for ElGamal-like encryption
There are several possibilities for ElGamal-like encryption schemes that, when used to instantiate the description of Fig. 3 , result in a protocol that provably satisfies goals I-IV. That said, the precise senses in which a particular instance can satisfy goal IV deserve some discussion. The most natural definition of security for key disabling is that an adversary in Adv({dvc, π 0 }) who is dvc svr
presented with a ciphertext c after the key has been disabled will be unable to decrypt c. A stronger definition for key disabling could require that c remain indecipherable, even if c were given to the adversary before key disabling occurred, as long as c were not sent to svr before disabling.
If the original ElGamal scheme is secure against indifferent chosen ciphertext attacks [38] , then the protocol of Fig. 3 can be proven secure in the former sense when instantiated with original ElGamal. However, the security of ElGamal in this sense has not been established and is an active area of research (see [35] ). There are, however, ElGamal-like encryption schemes that suffice to achieve even the latter, stronger security property, such as the following proposal from [40] called TDH1 . In this scheme, q is a κ-bit prime factor of p − 1. Encryption of a message m proceeds as follows:
The tuple c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 , c 5 is the ciphertext. Above, h 1 outputs a value from {0, 1} |m| , h 2 outputs an element of the subgroup of Z * p generated by g, and h 3 outputs a value from Z q . Note that h 2 may be implemented by defining h 2 (z) = (h (z)) (p−1)/q mod p, where h is a hash function that outputs a value from {0, 1}
λ+κ . Decryption takes the following form:
A second proposal from [40] , called TDH2 , can also be used to instantiate our protocol and achieve the stronger version of goal IV.
Proof of security for Generic
In this section, we provide a formal proof of security for the Generic system in the random oracle model [6] . Hash functions in the random oracle model are assumed to be ideal random functions. That is, for each possible input, each output bit of the hash function is chosen uniformly and independently. Although this is not a standard complexity theoretic assumption [12] , it has been useful for proving security for many practical cryptographic schemes.
Definitions
In order to state and prove security of our protocol formally, we must first state requirements for the security of a pseudorandom function, of an encryption scheme, of a signature scheme, and of Generic.
Pseudorandom
Security for encryption schemes. We specify adaptive chosen-ciphertext security [38] 
A is allowed to query a decryption oracle that takes a ciphertext as input and returns the decryption of that ciphertext (or ⊥ if the input is not a valid ciphertext). At some point, A generates two equal-length strings X 0 and X 1 and sends these to a test oracle, which chooses ξ ← R {0, 1}, and returns Y ← E pk (X ξ ). Then A continues as before, with the one restriction that it cannot query the decryption oracle on Y . Finally, A outputs ξ and succeeds if ξ = ξ. We say an attacker A (q, )-breaks E if the attacker makesueries to the decryption oracle, and 2 · Pr(A succeeds) − 1 ≥ . Note that this implies Pr(A guesses 0 | ξ = 0) − Pr(A guesses 0 | ξ = 1) ≥ Security for signature schemes. We specify existential unforgeability vs. chosen message attacks [22] for a signature scheme S = (G sig , S, V ). A forger is given pk, where (pk, sk) ← G sig (1 λ ), and tries to forge signatures with respect to pk. It is allowed to query a signature oracle (with respect to sk) on messages of its choice. It succeeds if after this it can output a valid forgery (m, σ), where V pk (m, σ) = 1, but m was not one of the messages signed by the signature oracle. We say a forger (q, )-breaks a scheme if the forger makesueries to the signature oracle and succeeds with probability at least .
Note: If a scheme uses random oracles, then those oracles are considered part of the scheme and may be queried by attackers/forgers along with the encryption/signature oracles.
Security for Generic. Let Generic[S, E, D] denote a Generic system based on a (matchable) signature scheme S = (G sig , S, V ), an encryption scheme E for the server, and a dictionary D. A forger is given pk, where (pk, sk) ← G sig (1 λ ), and the public data generated by the initialization procedure for the protocol along with certain secret data of the device and/or server (depending on the type of forger). As in the security definition for standard signature schemes, the goal of the forger is to forge signatures with respect to pk. Instead of a signature oracle, the forger may query a dvc oracle, a svr oracle, and (possibly) random oracles h and f . A random oracle may be queried at any time. It takes an input and returns a random value in the defined range. The svr oracle may be queried at any time by invoking serve with an input message; this either aborts or returns an output message (with respect to the secret server data generated by the initialization procedure).
The dvc oracle may be queried with start, finish, sign, and erase. On a start query, which corresponds to an initiation of the Generic protocol, the dvc oracle takes no input, returns an output message, and sets some internal state (with respect to the secret device data and the password generated by the initialization procedure). On a finish query, which corresponds to the device receiving a message ostensibly from the server, the dvc oracle takes an input message and either aborts or returns silently (depending on the message and the internal state set in the previous start and using the algorithm M from S).
On an erase query, the dvc oracle takes no input and returns no output. This is a "placeholder" query, which indicates when the user has stopped actively using the device and the device has erased all sensitive information; this is when the device may be vulnerable to capture. On a sign query, the dvc oracle takes a message as input and returns the signature of the message using the algorithm S sk from S. start, finish, sign, and erase must be queried in order, except that sign may be repeated as often as desired, and the complete sequence of four may be repeated as often as desired by the forger. (Of course, each query may have different inputs.) Also, a sign query may only be made between a finish query that does not abort and the next erase query to dvc.
The forger succeeds if after this it can output a valid forgery (m, σ), where V pk (m, σ) = 1, but m was not one of the messages signed by the device with a sign query.
Let q sign be the number of sign queries to dvc. Let q dvc be the number of start queries to dvc. Let q svr be the number of queries to the server that are not the output of a start query. For Theorem 2, where we model h and f as random oracles, let q h and q f be the number of queries to the respective random oracles, q o the number of other oracle queries not counted above, and q = (q dvc , q sign , q svr , q h , q f , q o ). In a slight abuse of notation, let |q| = q dvc + q sign + q svr + q h + q f + q o , i.e., the total number of oracle queries.
We say a forger (q, )-breaks Generic if it makes |q| oracle queries (of the respective type and to the respective oracles) and succeeds with probability at least . We say Generic is (q, )-secure if no forger (q, )-breaks Generic.
Theorems
In this section, we prove that if a forger breaks the Generic system with probability nonnegligibly more than what is inherently possible in a system of this kind (e.g., if the device is stolen, the attacker inherently has the ability to launch an online dictionary attack, but not an offline dictionary attack), then the underlying signature scheme or encryption scheme used in Generic can be broken with nonnegligible probability. This implies that if the underlying signature and encryption schemes are secure, our system will be as secure as inherently possible.
We prove security separately for the different types of attackers from Sect. 3.1. The idea behind each proof is a simulation argument. We assume that a forger F can break the Generic system, meaning that it can forge a message not signed by the device in the Generic system. We then construct a forger F * that forges in the underlying signature scheme. Basically F * will run F over a simulation of the Generic system, and when F succeeds in forging a signature in Generic (in a way not inherently possible, as discussed above), then F * will succeed in forging a signature in the underlying signature scheme.
In the security proof against a device-compromising (i.e., Adv({dvc})) forger F , there is a slight complication. If F were able to break the encryption scheme of the server, a forger F * as described above may not be able to simulate properly. Thus we show that either F forges signatures (in a way not inherently possible) in a simulation where all encryptions are of strings of zeroes, and thus we can construct a forger F * that succeeds in forging a signature in the underlying signature scheme, or F does not forge signatures (in a way not inherently possible) in that simulation, and thus it must be able to distinguish the true encryptions from the zeroed encryptions. Then we can construct an attacker A * that breaks the underlying encryption scheme. In addition, we note that the device-compromising forgers for which we prove this result are even stronger than allowed in Sect. 3: after capturing dvc, the forger is permitted to cause dvc to initiate the Generic protocol on a message of the forger's choice, with dvc using the correct password π 0 even if the forger does not know π 0 . This models a forger that may be able to capture the static data from the device without capturing the device itself, i.e., without the knowledge of the user.
For proving security against all types of forgers, one must assume that both h and f behave as random oracles. However, for certain types of forgers, weaker hash function properties suffice. 2 For proving security against a forger in Adv({dvc}), we make no requirement on the f function, and we only require h to have a negligible proba-bility of collisions over the dictionary D. If |D| were polynomial in κ, then it would suffice for h to be a collisionresistant hash function. If |D| were superpolynomial, that property would not suffice. However, it would suffice for h to be a permutation. 3 For proving security against a forger in Adv({svr, π 0 }), we make no requirement on the h function, and it would suffice for {f v } to be a pseudorandom function family.
In the theorems below, we use "≈" to indicate equality to within negligible factors. Moreover, in our simulations, the forger F is run at most once, and so the times of our simulations are straightforward and omitted from our theorem statements. Proof. Given F ∈ Adv({svr, π 0 }) that (q, )-breaks the Generic[S, E, D] system, we construct a forger F * for S. F * is given public key pk from S and simulates the Generic system for F , so that if F constructs a valid forgery, this will also be a valid forgery for S, and thus F * will succeed. Simulation: F * gives pk to F as the device's public signature key. Then F * generates the server's key pair (pk svr , sk svr ) and gives that to F . Next, F * generates the secret user password π 0 ← R D and gives that to F . Finally, F * generates the data a, b, c for the ticket τ in the normal way, using a random v ∈ {0, 1} κ , except that c is drawn randomly from {0, 1} λ . F * responds to svr queries as in the real protocol. F * also responds to dvc start queries as in the real protocol. However, for a dvc finish(η) query corresponding to a start query, F * simply checks that c = η ⊕ ρ (where ρ was computed in the start query) and has dvc abort if this is false. Then, assuming the dvc did not abort, for any subsequent dvc sign(m) query before an erase query, F * calls the signature oracle for S on m and returns the result.
Analysis: Let Generic be the Generic protocol with f v replaced by a perfectly random function, and let be the probability that F produces a forgery when run against Generic . By the pseudorandomness of f , ≈ . Now let be the probability that F forges in the simulation, and hence the probability that F * forges in the underlying signature scheme. One can see that the simulation above is statistically indistinguishable from Generic to F , and so ≈ ≈ . Proof. Given F ∈ Adv({dvc, svr}) that (q, )-breaks the Generic[S, E, D] system, we construct a forger F * for S. F * is given public key pk from S and simulates the Generic system for F , so that if F constructs a valid forgery, this will also be a valid forgery for S, and thus F * will succeed. Simulation: F * gives pk to F as the device's public signature key. Then F * generates the server's key pair (pk svr , sk svr ) and gives that to F . Next, F * generates the secret user password π 0 ← R D. Finally, F * generates the data a, b, c for the ticket τ in the normal way, using a random v ∈ {0, 1} κ , except that c is drawn randomly from {0, 1} λ . F * gives a, v, and τ ← E pksvr ( a, b, c ) to F . F * responds to an h(π) or f (v , π) query as a normal random oracle would, except that it aborts if π = π 0 (for an h() query) or π = π 0 and v = v (for an f () query). F * responds to svr and dvc queries as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Analysis: Unless F makes a query h(π 0 ) or f (v, π 0 ), which occurs with probability at most q h +q f |D| , the simulation is indistinguishable from the real protocol to F , so if F produced a forgery with probability in Generic, F * would produce a forgery with probability at least ≈ − q h +q f |D| in the underlying signature scheme. Proof. Given F ∈ Adv({dvc}) that (q, )-breaks the Generic[S, E, D] system, we show that we can construct either a forger F * against S or an attacker A * against E. We first show that if forger F wins (as defined below) against a certain simulation with probability greater than qsvr |D| + ψ 2 , we can construct a forger F * that can (q dvc , )-break S with ≈ ψ 2 . Assuming F does not win against that simulation with the probability stated above, then we show that we can construct an attacker A * that breaks E with probability at least ψ 2(1+q dvc ) . Part 1: F * is given public key pk from S and simulates the Generic system for F , so that if F constructs a valid forgery, this will also be a valid forgery for S, and thus F * will succeed. We say F wins against this simulation if F produces a valid forgery in the simulation, or if F makes a successful online password guess. This is defined as F making a server query with input (γ, δ, τ ), where δ = mac a ( γ, τ ) for the mac key a stored on the device, and either (1) τ is the ticket stored on the device and γ is a ciphertext not generated by a device start query, and where β, ρ ← D sksvr (γ), and β = h(π 0 ); or (2) τ is not the ticket stored on the device but γ was generated by a device start query, and where a , b , c ← D sksvr (τ ), and b = h(π 0 ).
Part 1 Simulation: F
* gives pk to F as the device's public signature key. Then F * generates the server's key pair (pk svr , sk svr ) and gives pk svr to F . Next, F * generates the secret user password π 0 ← R D. Finally, F * generates the data a, b, c for the ticket τ in the normal way, using a random v ∈ {0, 1} κ , except that c is drawn randomly from {0, 1} λ . F * gives a, v, and τ ← E pksvr ( 0 2κ+λ ) to F . F * responds to svr serve(γ, δ, τ ) queries as follows: Case 1: (γ, δ, τ ) is from a dvc start query: Return ρ ⊕ c (where ρ was from the start query). Case 2: γ and τ are from a dvc start query, but not δ: Have svr abort. Case 3: τ = τ , but γ is not from a dvc start query: Verify δ like a normal server, but using the a value from initialization as the mac key. Then compute β, ρ ← D sksvr (γ). F * responds to a dvc start query as a normal dvc would, except setting γ ← E pksvr (0 κ+λ ). For a dvc finish(η) query corresponding to a start query, F * simply checks that c = η ⊕ ρ (where ρ was computed in the start query) and has the dvc abort if this is false. Then, assuming the dvc did not abort, for any subsequent dvc sign(m) query before an erase query, F * calls the signature oracle for S on m and returns the result.
Part 1 Analysis: The probability that F makes a successful online password guess is at most qsvr |D| , disregarding negligible probabilities (since π 0 was chosen randomly and h has a negligible probability of collision over D), so if F wins against the simulation with probability at least qsvr |D| + ψ 2 , it produces a forgery with probability at least ψ 2 , and thus F * produces a forgery in the underlying signature scheme with probability at least ≈ ψ 2 . Part 2: For the second part of the proof, we assume that the probability of F winning in Part 1 is at most qsvr |D| + ψ 2 . Then we construct an attacker A * that breaks E with probability ψ 2(1+q dvc ) . Our attacker A * is given a public key pk from E and runs a simulation of the Generic system for F .
First consider a simulator that gives pk to F as the server's public encryption key and then simulates Generic exactly, but using a decryption oracle to decrypt messages encrypted under key pk by F . Note that the decryptions of τ and any γ generated by the dvc would already be known to the simulator. Now consider the same simulation, but with the normal messages encrypted by the simulator replaced with strings of zeros. (Naturally, the server pretends the encryptions are of the normal messages, not the strings of zeros.) The latter simulation is equivalent to the Part 1 simulation, except that the latter simulation does not abort on a successful online password guess. Still, the probability of F forging in the latter simulation is at most qsvr |D| + ψ 2 , while the probability of F forging in the former simulation is at least qsvr |D| + ψ. Now we use a standard hybrid argument to construct A * . Let experiment j ∈ {0, . . . , q dvc + 1} correspond to the first j ciphertexts (generated by the simulator) being encryptions of the normal messages, and the remainder being encryptions of strings of 0s, and let p j be the probability of F forging in experiment j. Then the average value for i ∈ {0, . . . , q dvc } of p i+1 − p i is at least ψ 2(1+q dvc ) . Therefore, to construct A * , we simply have A * choose a random value i ∈ {0, . . . , q dvc } and run experiment i as above but calling the test oracle for the (i + 1) st encryption to be generated by the simulator, where the two messages X 0 and X 1 submitted to the test oracle are the normal message and the string of zeros, respectively. Then A * outputs 0 if F forges (meaning it believes X 0 was encrypted by the test oracle) and 1 otherwise. By the analysis above, A * breaks E with probability ψ 2(1+q dvc ) .
Proof of security for S-RSA
In this section, we provide a formal proof of security for the S-RSA system in the random oracle model.
Definitions
In order to state and prove security of our protocol formally, we must first state requirements for the security of S-RSA. Security for S-RSA. Let S-RSA[E, D] denote an S-RSA system based on an encryption scheme E for the server and dictionary D. A forger is given e, N where
the public data generated by the initialization procedure for the protocol along with certain secret data of the device, server, and/or the user's password (depending on the type of forger). The goal of the forger is to forge RSA signatures with respect to e, N . There is a dvc oracle, a disable oracle, a svr oracle, and (possibly) random oracles h and f . A random oracle may be queried at any time. It takes an input and returns a random value in the defined range. The disable oracle may be queried with getVals. It responds with a value t and the device's ticket τ . The svr oracle may be queried with serve and disable. On a serve(γ, δ, τ) query, which represents the receipt of a message in the S-RSA protocol ostensibly from the device, it either aborts or returns an output message η (with respect to the secret server data generated by the initialization procedure). On a disable(t, τ ) query, which represents a disable request, the svr oracle rejects all future queries with the ticket τ if t corresponds to τ (see Sect. 5. 1.3) .
The dvc oracle may be queried with start and finish. We assume there is an implicit notion of sessions so that the dvc oracle can determine the start query corresponding to a finish query. On a start(m) query, which represents a request to initiate the S-RSA protocol, the dvc returns an output message γ, δ, τ and sets some internal state (with respect to the secret device data and the password generated by the initialization procedure). On the corresponding finish(η) query, which represents the device's receipt of a response ostensibly from the server, the dvc oracle either aborts or returns a valid signature for the message m given as input to the previous start query.
A forger of type Adv({svr, π 0 }), Adv({dvc, svr}), or Adv({dvc}) succeeds if after this it can output a pair (m, s, r ) where s e ≡ N encode(m, r) and there was no start(m) query. A type Adv({dvc, π 0 }) forger succeeds if after this it can output a pair (m, s, r ) where s e ≡ N encode(m, r) and there was no serve(γ, δ, τ) query, where D sksvr (γ) = m, * , * , * , before a disable(t, τ ) query that disables the device's ticket τ .
Let q dvc be the number of start queries to the device. Let q svr be the number of server serve queries. For Theorem 5, where we model h and f as random oracles, let q h and q f be the number of queries to the respective random oracles. Let q o be the number of other oracle queries not counted above. Let q = (q dvc , q svr , q o , q h , q f ). In a slight abuse of notation, let |q| = q dvc + q svr + q o + q h + q f , i.e., the total number of oracle queries. We say a forger (q, )-breaks S-RSA if it makes |q| oracle queries (of the respective type and to the respective oracles) and succeeds with probability at least .
Theorems
Here we prove that if a forger breaks the S-RSA system with probability nonnegligibly more than what is inherently possible in a system of this kind, then either the underlying RSA signature scheme or the underlying encryption scheme used in S-RSA can be broken with nonnegligible probability. This implies that if the underlying RSA signature scheme and the underlying encryption scheme are secure, our system will be as secure as inherently possible. As in Sect. 6, we prove security separately for the different types of attackers from Sect. 3.1. One difference is that here we also prove security for a forger in Adv({dvc, π 0 }), and in this case we make no requirement on either h or f . Proof. Given F ∈ Adv({svr, π 0 }) that (q, )-breaks the S-RSA[E, D] system, we construct a forger F * for the underlying RSA signature scheme. F * is given public key e, N for the RSA signature scheme and simulates the S-RSA system for F , so that any forgery constructed by F will be a forgery in the underlying RSA signature scheme. Simulation: F * gives e, N to F as the device's public signature key. Then F * generates the server's key pair (pk svr , sk svr ) and gives that to F . Next, F * generates the user password π 0 ← R D and gives that to F . Finally, F * generates a, b, u, d 2 , N for the ticket τ in the normal way, using random t, v ∈ {0, 1} κ , except that d 2 is drawn randomly from Z N . F * responds to svr queries as in the real protocol. F * responds to dvc start(m) queries by querying the signature oracle to get σ = s, r and then responding as in the real protocol using that r value. F * responds to a dvc finish(η) query corresponding to a start(m) query by computing ν = η ⊕ ρ (where ρ was computed in the start(m) query) and checking that ν ≡ N (encode(m, r)) d 2 . If this is false, F * has dvc abort. Otherwise, F * returns the σ returned from the signature oracle query in the start query. F * responds to a getVals query to the disable oracle by returning t, τ .
Analysis: Let S-RSA be the S-RSA protocol with f v replaced by a perfectly random function, and let be the probability that F produces a forgery when run against S-RSA . By the pseudorandomness of f , ≈ . Now let be the probability that F forges in the simulation and hence the probability that F * forges in the underlying RSA signature scheme. One can see that the simulation above is statistically indistinguishable from S-RSA to F , and so ≈ ≈ . Proof. Given F ∈ Adv({dvc, svr}) that (q, )-breaks the S-RSA[E, D] system, we construct a forger F * for the underlying RSA signature scheme. F * is given public key e, N for the RSA signature scheme and simulates the S-RSA system for F , so that any forgery constructed by F without F guessing the password (as described below) will be a forgery in the underlying RSA signature scheme.
Simulation: F * gives e, N to F as the device's public signature key. Then F * generates the server's key pair (pk svr , sk svr ) and gives that to F . Next, F * generates the secret user password π 0 ← R D. Finally, F * generates the data a, b, u, d 2 , N for the ticket τ in the normal way, using random t, v ∈ {0, 1} κ , except that d 2 is drawn randomly from Z N . F * gives a, v, and τ ← E pksvr ( a, b, u, d 2 , N ) to F . F * responds to an h(π) or f (v , π) query as a normal random oracle would, except that it aborts if π = π 0 (for an h() query) or π = π 0 and v = v (for an f () query). F * responds to queries to the svr, dvc, and disable oracles as in the proof of Theorem 4.
Analysis: Unless F makes a query h(π 0 ) or f (v, π 0 ) , which occurs with probability at most q h +q f |D| , the simulation is indistinguishable from the real protocol to F , so if F produced a forgery with probability in S-RSA, F * would produce a forgery with probability at least ≈ − q h +q f |D| in the underlying RSA signature scheme. Proof. Given F ∈ Adv({dvc}) that (q, )-breaks the S-RSA[E, D] system, we show that we can construct either a forger F * for the underlying RSA signature scheme or an attacker A * against E. We first show that if forger F wins (as defined below) against a certain simulation with probability greater than qsvr |D| + ψ 2 , we can construct a forger F * that can (q dvc , )-break the underlying RSA signature scheme with ≈ ψ 2 . Assuming F does not win against that simulation with the probability stated above, then we show that we can construct an attacker A * that (2q svr , )-breaks E with ≈ ψ 2(1+q dvc ) . Part 1: F * is given public key e, N for the RSA signature scheme and simulates the S-RSA system for F . We say F wins against the simulation if F produces a valid forgery or if F makes a successful online password guess. This is defined as F making a server query with input (γ, δ, τ ), where δ = mac a ( γ, τ ) for the mac key a stored on the device, and either (1) τ is the ticket stored on the device and γ is a ciphertext not generated by a device start query, where m, r, β, ρ ← D sksvr (γ) and β = h(π 0 ); or (2) τ is not the ticket stored on the device but γ was generated by a device start query, where a , b , u , d 2 , N ← D sksvr (τ ) and b = h(π 0 ). Part 1 Simulation: F * gives e, N to F as the device's public signature key. Then F * generates the server's key pair (pk svr , sk svr ) and gives pk svr to F . Next, F * generates the secret user password π 0 ← R D. Finally, F * generates a, b, u, d 2 , N for the ticket τ in the normal way, using random t, v ∈ {0, 1} κ , except that d 2 is drawn randomly from Z N . F * gives a, v, and τ ← E pksvr (0 3κ+2λ ) to F . F * responds to a getVals query to the disable oracle by returning t, τ . F * responds to a svr disable(t , τ ) query as a normal server would, but using the u value generated in the initialization if τ = τ . F * responds to svr serve(γ, δ, τ ) queries for a τ that has not been disabled as follows:
, where m, r, and ρ were from the start query. Case 2: γ and τ are from a dvc start query, but not δ: Have svr abort. Case 3: τ = τ , but γ is not from a dvc start query: Verify the mac like a normal server, but using the a value from Case 5: τ = τ and γ is not from a dvc start query: Behave like a normal server. F * responds to a dvc start(m) query as in Theorem 4, except setting γ ← E pksvr (0 |m|+κ sig +κ+λ ). F * responds to a dvc finish(η) query as in Theorem 4.
Part 1 Analysis: The probability that F makes a successful online password guess is at most qsvr |D| , disregarding negligible probabilities (since π 0 was chosen randomly and h has a negligible probability of collision over D), so if F wins against the simulation with probability at least ψ 2 + qsvr |D| , it produces a forgery with probability at least ψ 2 , and thus F * produces a forgery in the underlying RSA signature scheme with probability at least ≈ ψ 2 . Part 2: For the second part of the proof, we assume that the probability of F winning in Part 1 is at most qsvr |D| + ψ 2 . Then we construct an attacker A * that breaks E with probability ψ 2(1+q dvc ) . Our attacker A * is given a public key pk from E and runs a simulation of the S-RSA system for F .
First, consider a simulator that gives pk to F as the server's public encryption key and then simulates S-RSA exactly, but using a decryption oracle to decrypt messages encrypted under key pk by the adversary. There will be at most 2q svr of these. (Note that the decryptions of τ and any γ generated by the dvc would already be known to the simulator.) This simulation would be perfectly indistinguishable from the real protocol to F . Now consider the same simulation but with the ticket and all γ values generated by the device changed to encryptions of strings of zeros. (Naturally, the server pretends the encryptions are of the normal messages, not strings of zeros.) The latter simulation is equivalent to the Part 1 simulation, except that the latter simulation does not abort on a successful online password guess. Still, the probability of F forging in the latter simulation is at most qsvr |D| + ψ 2 , while the probability of F forging in the former simulation is at least qsvr |D| + ψ. Now we use a standard hybrid argument to construct A * . Let experiment j ∈ {0, . . . , q dvc + 1} correspond to the first j ciphertexts (generated by A * ) being encryptions of the normal messages, and the remainder being encryptions of strings of 0s, and let p j be the probability of F forging in experiment j. Then the average value for i ∈ {0, . . . , q dvc } of p i+1 − p i is at least ψ 2(1+q dvc ) . Therefore, to construct A * , we simply have A * choose a random value i ∈ {0, . . . , q dvc } and run experiment i as above, but calling the test oracle for the (i + 1) st encryption to be generated by the simulator, where the two messages X 0 and X 1 submitted to the test oracle are the normal message and the string of zeros, respectively. Then A * outputs 0 if F forges (meaning it believes X 0 was encrypted by the test oracle) and 1 otherwise. By the analysis above, A * breaks E with probability ψ 2(1+q dvc ) , disregarding negligible probabilities.
Theorem 7. Suppose the underlying RSA signature scheme is deterministic (i.e., κ sig = 0). If a type Adv({dvc, π 0 }) forger (q, )-breaks the S-RSA[E, D] system, then either there exists an attacker A * that (2q svr , )-breaks E with ≈ 2(1+q dvc ) or there exists a forger F * that (2q svr , )-breaks the underlying RSA signature scheme with ≈ 2 .
Proof. Given F ∈ Adv({dvc, π 0 }) that (q, )-breaks the S-RSA[E, D] system, we show that we can construct either a forger F * for the underlying RSA signature scheme or an attacker A * against E. We first construct a forger F * that runs F against a simulation of S-RSA such that if F forges in the simulation with probability 2 , F * (2q svr , )-breaks the underlying RSA signature scheme with ≈ 2 . Assuming F does not forge a signature in that simulation with probability 2 , then we show that we can construct an attacker A * that (2q svr , )-breaks E with ≈ 2(1+q dvc ) .
Part 1: F * is given public key e, N for the RSA signature scheme and simulates the S-RSA system for F .
Part 1 Simulation: F * gives e, N to F as the device's public signature key. Then F * generates the server's key pair (pk svr , sk svr ) and gives pk svr to F . Next, F * generates π 0 ← R D and gives π 0 to F . Finally, F * generates the data a, b, u, and d 1 in the normal way, using random t, v ∈ {0, 1} κ , but computes τ ← E pksvr (0 3κ+2λ ). F * gives a, v, and τ to F .
F * responds to a disable oracle query as in the real system. F * responds to a svr disable(t , τ ) query as a normal server would, but using the u value generated in the initialization if τ = τ . F * responds to svr serve(γ, δ, τ ) queries for a τ that has not been disabled as follows: Case 1: (γ, δ, τ ) is from a dvc start(m) query: Query the signature oracle to get s, r (where |r| = 0, since the signature scheme is deterministic), and then return
where ρ is from the start query. Case 2: γ and τ are from a dvc start query, but not δ:
Have svr abort. Case 3: τ = τ , but γ is not from a dvc start query: Verify δ like a normal server, but using the a value from initialization as the mac key. Then compute m, r, β, ρ ← D sksvr (γ). Using the b value from initialization, if β = b, have svr abort. Otherwise, query the signature oracle to get σ = s, r and return ρ ⊕ (s/(encode(m, r)) d 1 mod N ). Case 4: τ = τ , but γ is from a dvc start(m) query: Say a , b , u , d 2 , N ← D sksvr (τ ). Behave like a normal server, but using m, r, β, and ρ from the dvc start(m) query.
Case 5: τ = τ and γ is not from a dvc start query: Behave like a normal server. F * responds to a dvc start(m) query as a normal dvc would, except setting γ ← E pksvr (0 |m|+κ+λ ). For a dvc finish(η) query corresponding to a start(m) query that returned (γ, δ, τ), if η was not returned from a svr serve(γ, δ, τ) query, have dvc abort. Otherwise, F * returns the signature found in that serve(γ, δ, τ) query.
Part 1 Analysis: If F forges in the simulation, then F * forges in the underlying signature scheme. Part 2: The second part of the proof is similar to Part 2 of the proof of Theorem 6, except with ψ replaced by , and no qsvr |D| term.
Proof of security for D-ElG
In this section, we provide a proof of security for the D-ElG system instantiated with an ElGamal-like encryption scheme.
Definitions
We first define security for an ElGamal-like (ElGL) encryption scheme and for the D-ElG protocol itself.
Security for ElGL encryption schemes. The security for an ElGL encryption scheme is defined exactly like the security for a standard encryption scheme, except for the definition of the decryption oracle. Assume that the public key pair is ( g, p, q, y , g, p, q, x ) ← G ElG (1 λ ) and the decryption oracle receives a ciphertext c. If valid(c) = 0, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, it returns z = (select(c)) x mod p, from which the decryption of c can be computed using reveal(z, c). (Note that in the standard definition of security for encryption schemes, the decryption oracle would not return z, but the decryption of c.)
Note: The TDH1 and TDH2 encryption schemes from [40] , when restricted to a single server, are in fact secure ElGL encryption schemes under standard cryptographic assumptions.
Security for D-ElG. Let D-ElG[E,D] denote a D-ElG system based on an encryption scheme E for the server and dictionary D. An attacker A is given g, p, q, y , where
the public data generated by the initialization procedure for the protocol, and certain secret data of the device, server, and/or the user's password (depending on the type of attacker). There is a test oracle, dvc oracle, a disable oracle, a svr oracle, random oracle h zkp , and (possibly) random oracles h and f . A may query the disable oracle and the random oracles as in S-RSA. Queries to the dvc and svr oracles are also similar to S-RSA, with the following changes. A may query the dvc oracle with a start(c) query, which corresponds to a protocol initiation on ElGL ciphertext c, and a finish(η, e, s) query. A may query the svr oracle with a serve(γ, δ, τ) query corresponding to an invocation ostensibly by the device, which returns a tuple η, e, s. At some point, A generates two equal length strings X 0 and X 1 and sends these to the test oracle, which chooses ξ ← R {0, 1}, and returns the ElGL encryption Y ← E pk (X ξ ). Then A continues as before, with the restriction that if A is of type Adv({svr, π 0 }), Adv({dvc, svr}), or Adv({dvc}), then it cannot query the dvc with a start(Y ) query, and if A is of type Adv({dvc, π 0 }), then it cannot query the svr with serve(γ, δ, τ) query, where D sksvr (γ) = Y, * , * , before a disable(t, τ ) query that disables the device's ticket τ . Finally, A outputs ξ and succeeds if ξ = ξ. Let q dvc , q svr , q h , q f , q o , q, and |q| be defined in the same manner as in Sect. 7. We say that A (q, )-breaks D-ElG if A makes |q| oracle queries (of the respective types and to the respective oracles) and 2 · Pr(A succeeds) − 1 ≥ . Note that this implies Pr(A guesses 0 | ξ = 0) − Pr(A guesses 0 | ξ = 1) ≥
Theorems
Here we prove that if an attacker breaks the D-ElG system with probability nonnegligibly more than what is inherently possible in a system of this kind, then either the underlying ElGL encryption scheme or the underlying server encryption scheme used in D-ElG can be broken with nonnegligible probability. This implies that if the underlying ElGL encryption scheme and the underlying server encryption scheme are secure, our system will be as secure as inherently possible. As in Sect. 7, we prove security separately for the different types of attackers from Sect. 3.1. Proof. Given A ∈ Adv({svr, π 0 }) that (q, )-breaks the D-ElG[E, D] system, we construct an attacker A * for the underlying ElGL scheme. A * is given public key g, p, q, y for the ElGL scheme and simulates the D-ElG system for A such that if A succeeds in attacking D-ElG, A * will succeed in attacking the underlying ElGL scheme.
Simulation: A * gives g, p, q, y to A as the device's public encryption key. Then A * generates the server's key pair (pk svr , sk svr ) and gives that to A. Next, A * generates the data a, b, u, g, p, q, x 2 for the ticket τ in the normal way, using random t, v ∈ {0, 1} κ , except that x 2 is drawn randomly from Z q . A * responds to svr and disable queries as in the real protocol. A * also responds to dvc start(c) queries as in the real protocol. A * responds to queries to the test oracle by forwarding the query to the underlying ElGL test oracle and responding with the answer from the underlying test oracle. Say X 0 , X 1 are the inputs to the test oracle and Y is the response.
A * responds to queries to h zkp as a normal random oracle. Now consider a dvc finish(η, e, s) query, and let start(c) be the corresponding query initiating this instance of the protocol. (Without loss of generality, we may assume valid(c) = 1 and c = Y .) A * retrieves the ρ value generated during start(c) and uses it to obtain ν ← η ⊕ ρ. A * also computes w ← select(c). If ν q ≡ p 1 or e = h zkp ( w, ν, w s ν −e mod p, g s−ex 2 mod p ), then A * simulates a dvc abort. Subsequently, if ν ≡ p w x 2 , then A * itself aborts and outputs 0. Otherwise, A * queries the ElGL decryption oracle with c to obtain a value z and computes the plaintext m ← reveal(z, c), which is then returned by A * in response to the finish(η, e, s) query. Finally, if A outputs a bit ξ for the D-ElG system, A * outputs the same bit ξ for the underlying ElGL scheme.
Analysis: Note that if A * itself does not abort, then the response by the simulation for a device finish(η, e, s) is exactly the same as the response in the real protocol since the z value computed by A * would be the same as the z value computed by the device. Here we show that the probability that A * aborts is negligible. First, note that if ν q ≡ p 1 and ν ≡ p w x 2 , then for any values ν and ν , the probability that there is an s for which e = h zkp ( w, ν, ν , ν ), ν ≡ p w s ν −e and ν ≡ p g s−ex 2 is 1/q. Thus the probability that A ever produces values η, e, s that determine such values ν, ν , ν is negligible. Now let D-ElG be the D-ElG protocol with f v replaced by a perfectly random function, and let be the advantage of A when run against D-ElG . By the pseudorandomness of f , ≈ . Now let be the advantage of A in the simulation and hence the advantage of A * in the underlying ElGL scheme. One can see that the simulation above is statistically indistinguishable from D-ElG to A, and so ≈ ≈ . Proof. Given A ∈ Adv({dvc, svr}) that (q, )-breaks the D-ElG[E, D] system, we construct an attacker A * for the underlying ElGL scheme. A * is given public key g, p, q, y for the ElGL scheme and simulates the D-ElG system for A such that if A succeeds in attacking D-ElG without guessing the password (as described below), A * will succeed in attacking the underlying ElGL scheme.
Simulation: A * gives g, p, q, y to A as the device's public encryption key. Then A * generates the server's key pair (pk svr , sk svr ) and gives that to A. Next, A * generates the user password π 0 ← R D. Finally, A * generates the data a, b, u, g, p, q, x 2 for the ticket τ in the normal way, using random t, v ∈ {0, 1} κ , except that x 2 is drawn randomly from Z q . A * gives a, v, and τ ← E pksvr ( a, b, u, g, p, q, x 2 ) to A.
A * responds to a h(π) or f (v , π ) query as a normal random oracle would, except that it aborts if π = π 0 (for an h query) or if v = v and π = π 0 (for an f query). . Assuming A does not win against that simulation with the probability stated above, we then show that we can construct an attacker A * that (2q svr , )-breaks E with ≈ ψ 2(1+q dvc ) . Part 1: A * * is given public key g, p, q, y for the ElGL scheme and simulates the D-ElG system for A. We say A wins if A succeeds in guessing which of the two challenge ciphertexts X 0 , X 1 was encrypted by the test oracle or if A makes a successful online password guess. This is defined as A making a serve(γ, δ, τ ) query where δ = mac a ( γ, τ ) for the mac key a stored on the device, and either (1) τ is the ticket stored on the device and γ is a ciphertext not generated by a device start query, where m, β, ρ ← D sksvr (γ) and β = h(π 0 ); or (2) τ is not the ticket stored on the device but γ was generated by a device start query, where a , b , u , g , p , q , x 2 ← D sksvr (τ ) and b = h(π 0 ). Part 1 Simulation: A * * gives g, p, q, y to A as the device's public encryption key. Then A * * generates the server's key pair (pk svr , sk svr ) and gives pk svr to A. Next, A * * generates the user password π 0 ← R D. Finally, A * * generates a, b, u, g, p, q, x 2 for the ticket τ in the normal way, using t, v ∈ {0, 1} κ , except that x 2 is drawn randomly from Z q . A * * gives a, v, and τ ← E pksvr (0 5κ+2λ ) to A. A * * responds to a test oracle query, a disable oracle query, and any h zkp query by A as in the proof of Theorem 8.
A * * responds to a svr disable(t , τ ) query as a normal server would, but using the u value generated in the initialization if τ = τ . A * * responds to serve(γ, δ, τ ) queries for a τ that has not been disabled as follows:
Case 1: (γ, δ, τ ) is from a dvc start(c) query: Compute ν, e, s as a normal server, using x 2 generated in initialization and c and ρ from the start(c) query. Case 2: γ and τ are from a dvc start query, but not δ: Have svr abort. Case 3: τ = τ , but γ is not from a dvc start query: Verify δ like a normal server, but using the a value from initialization as the mac key. Then compute c, β, ρ ← D sksvr (γ). Abort the simulation if β = b (this is a successful online password guess), and have svr abort if β = b. Case 4: τ = τ , but γ is from a dvc start query: Compute a , b , u , g , p , q , x 2 ← D sksvr (τ ). Verify δ like a normal server, using mac key a . Abort the simulation if b = b (this is a successful online password guess), and have svr abort if b = b. Case 5: τ = τ and γ is not from a dvc start query: Behave like a normal server.
A * * responds to a dvc start(c) query as a normal dvc would, except setting γ ← E pksvr (0 |c|+κ+λ ). A * * responds to a dvc finish(η, e, s) query as in the proof of Theorem 8.
Finally, if A outputs a bit ξ for the D-ElG system, A * * outputs the same bit ξ for the underlying ElGL scheme.
Part 1 Analysis: The probability that A makes a successful online password guess is at most qsvr |D| , disregarding negligible probabilities (since π 0 was chosen randomly), so if A wins with probability at least E with probability ψ 2(1+q dvc ) . Our attacker A * is given the public key pk for E and runs a simulation of the D-ElG system for A.
First, consider a simulator that gives pk to A as the server's public encryption key and then simulates D-ElG exactly, but using a decryption oracle to decrypt messages encrypted under key pk by the adversary. There will be at most 2q svr of these. (Note that the decryptions of τ and any γ generated by the dvc would already be known to the simulator.) This simulation would be perfectly indistinguishable from the real protocol to A. Now consider the same simulation but with the ticket and all γ values generated by the device changed to encryptions of strings of zeros. (Naturally, the server pretends the encryptions are of the normal messages, not strings of zeros.) The latter simulation is equivalent to the Part 1 simulation, except that the latter simulation does not abort on a successful online password guess. Still, the probability of A winning in the latter simulation is at most 1 2 + qsvr |D| + ψ 2 , while the probability of A winning in the former simulation is at least 1 2 + qsvr |D| + ψ. Now we use a standard hybrid argument to construct A * . Let experiment j ∈ {0, . . . , q dvc + 1} correspond to the first j ciphertexts (generated by A * ) being encryptions of the normal messages, and the remainder being encryptions of strings of 0s, and let p j be the probability of A winning in experiment j. Then the average value for i ∈ {0, . . . , q dvc } of p i+1 − p i is at least ψ 2(1+q dvc ) .
Therefore, to construct A * , we simply have A * choose a random value i ∈ {0, . . . , q dvc } and run experiment i as above, but calling the test oracle for E for the (i + 1) st encryption it generates, where the two messages X 0 and X 1 submitted to the test oracle are the normal message and the string of zeros, respectively. Then A * outputs 0 if A wins (meaning A * believes X 0 was encrypted by the test oracle) and 1 otherwise. By the analysis above, A * breaks E with probability ψ 2(1+q dvc ) . Proof. Given A ∈ Adv({dvc, π 0 }) that (q, )-breaks the D-ElG[E, D] system, we show that we can construct either an attacker A * * for the underlying ElGL scheme or an attacker A * against E. We first show that if A succeeds against a certain simulation with probability greater than 1 2 + 2 , we can construct an attacker A * * that can (q svr , )-break the underlying ElGL scheme with ≈ 2 . Assuming A does not succeed against that simulation with the probability stated above, then we show that we can construct an attacker A * that breaks E with probability at least ≈ 2(1+q dvc ) .
Part 1: A * * is given g, p, q, y for the ElGL encryption scheme and simulates the D-ElG system for A.
Part 1 Simulation: A * * gives g, p, q, y to A as the device's public signature key. Then A * * generates the server's key pair (pk svr , sk svr ) and gives pk svr to A. Next, A * * generates π 0 ← R D and gives π 0 to A. Finally, A * * generates a, b, u, and x 1 in the normal way, using random t, v ∈ {0, 1} κ , but computes τ ← E pksvr (0 5κ+2λ ). A * * gives a, v, and τ to A.
A * * responds to a test oracle query, a disable oracle query, an h zkp query, and a svr disable(t , τ ) query as as in the proof of Theorem 10 (Part 1 Simulation).
A * * responds to svr serve(γ, δ, τ ) queries for a τ that has not been disabled as follows: Case 1: (γ, δ, τ ) is from a dvc start(c) query: Retrieve c and ρ from the start(c) query. Query the decryption oracle with c to get z, compute w ← select(c), ν ← zw −x 1 mod p, e ← R Z q , and s ← R Z q , and "backpatch" h zkp :
h zkp ( w, ν, w s ν −e mod p, g s (yg −x 1 ) −e mod p )←e
Return ρ ⊕ ν, e, s . Case 2: γ and τ are from a dvc start query, but not δ: Have svr abort. Case 3: τ = τ , but γ is not from a dvc start query: Verify δ like a normal server, but using the a value from initialization as the mac key. Then compute c, β, ρ ← D sksvr (γ). Have svr abort if β = b or valid(c) = 0. Otherwise, query the decryption oracle with c to get z, compute w ← select(c), ν ← zw −x 1 mod p, e ← R Z q , and s ← R Z q , and "backpatch" h zkp :
Return ρ ⊕ ν, e, s . Case 4: τ = τ , but γ is from a dvc start query: Compute a , b , u , g , p , q , x 2 ← D sksvr (τ ). Behave like a normal server, but using c, β, and ρ from the dvc start(c) query. Case 5: τ = τ and γ is not from a dvc start query: Behave like a normal server. A * * responds to a start(c) query as a normal dvc would, except setting γ ← E pksvr (0 |c|+κ+λ ). For a finish(η, e, s) query corresponding to a start(c) query that returned (γ, δ, τ), if η, e, s was not returned from a svr serve(γ, δ, τ) query, have dvc abort. Otherwise, for the z value found in that serve(γ, δ, τ) query, A * * returns the plaintext m ← reveal(z, c).
Part 1 Analysis: If A distinguishes an encryption of X 0 from X 1 with probability at least 
Conclusion
Dictionary attacks against password-protected private keys are a significant threat if the device holding those keys may be captured. In this paper, we have presented an approach to render devices largely invulnerable to such attacks. Our approach requires that the device interact with a remote server to perform its private key operations. Therefore, it is primarily suited to a device that uses its private key in interactive cryptographic protocols (and so necessarily has network connectivity to reach the server when use of its private key is required). A prime example is a device that plays the role of a client in the TLS protocol with client authentication. Though our protocol requires the device to interact with a remote server, we prove that this server poses no threat to the device. Specifically, it gains no significant advantage in forging signatures that can be verified with the device's public key or decrypting messages encrypted under the device's public key. In particular, it cannot mount a dictionary attack to expose the device's private key. Even if both the device and server are compromised, the attacker must still succeed in an offline dictionary attack before signing on behalf of the device.
In addition to the above properties, we presented protocols that further provide the feature of key disabling. This enables the user to disable a device's private key immediately, even after the device has been captured and even if the attacker has guessed the user's password. Once disabled, the device's key is provably useless to the attacker (provided that the attacker cannot also compromise the server). Key disabling is thus an effective complement to any public key revocation mechanism that might exist, particularly if there is a delay for revoking public keys.
